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The Euro’s roots can be traced back to the creation of the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1979. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol argues that the negotiations that led to the
establishment of the EMS can shed light on the current travails of the Eurozone, and that
there are some striking similarities with recent Eurozone summits.  Looking at the EMS
negotiations now furthers our understanding of European integration and the evolution of the
world monetary system.
“The Germans, especially when they get onto their persecution theme, “You are sacrificing
German stability on the altar of external monetary stability” rightly get little sympathy.” It is not
a Spanish, Greek or Italian minister who made this statement at a press conference this year, following yet
another failure to reach an agreement on the creation of Eurobonds or growth issues. It is from a British
report at the time of the negotiations on the creation of the European Monetary System. The EMS, created in
1979, is part of the prehistory of the euro: it was a first concrete attempt at organising the European Union’s –
that was still then the European Economic Community (EEC) – currency relations. And the discussions that
took place then bear a striking resemblance to our current predicament.
Back in late 1960s, EEC’s heads of
government talked with great fanfare about
the creation of a European Monetary Union
by 1980. By 1980 however, what had been
put in place was a pretty trivial piece of
administrative business – an exchange
rate system almost identical with the one
already in operation, the so-called snake.
True, the EMS had a number of
advantages. Unlike the snake, it managed
to bring together all EEC currencies
(except the sterling), it increased the credit
mechanisms, its wider bands for less
developed economies – Ireland and Italy –
made it overall more flexible, and, crucially,
it was based on a wider economic policy
consensus than ever before.
The traditional explanation of the EMS
creation focuses on one year of
negotiations, 1978, and the doings of the
“great men” of the time, namely Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the French president, Helmut Schmidt, the German
chancellor, and Roy Jenkins, the president of the European Commission. According to that explanation, the
EMS emerges suddenly, its negotiations would have been swift, and they would have led to the creation of a
brand-new scheme, considerably improved by comparison with the snake.
This conventional view of the EMS creation can be challenged by highlighting two longer-term processes that
are still at work at the present day. Based on extensive archive research, I have shown that the emergence of
the EMS must also be seen in the context of two interacting longer-term processes. The first was a
transnational learning process involving powerful, networked European monetary elite that shaped a habit of
cooperation among technocrats. The second stresses the importance of the European Council, which held
regular meetings between heads of government beginning in 1974, giving EEC legitimacy to monetary
initiatives that had previously involved semi-secret and bilateral negotiations. The interaction of these two
features changed the EMS from a fairly trivial piece of administrative business to a tremendously important
political agreement.
As European leaders desperately needed a victory, they largely puffed up the agreement as some sort of
mega-demonstration of the joys of European integration. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing elaborated at length on the
rechristening of the European unit of account into the “European Currency Unit”, the ECU, as if it were the
embryo of a future common or single currency. The reality of the agreement, however, was different. The
EMS did not solve the central problems of European economies: it set out no mechanism able to improve the
convergence of the EEC member states, the dream of setting up a European Monetary Fund had been put off
due to German opposition, and the overall agreement rested on the goodwill of European leaders to
implement individual national economic policies that would be compatible with it, rather than an all-
encompassing supranational scheme. The EMS was not really the turning point announced, but instead an
important political and monetary agreement, the foundations of which remained particularly shaky.
Is this what is happening now? The Irish prime minister talked of a “seismic shift” after the conclusion of the
agreement at the last European summit. Mario Monti appeared as a great negotiator, while François
Hollande’s call for “talking growth” rather than austerity alone seemed to have received some echo. The new
European agreement is certainly full of potential. It does highlight a determination to find a solution to the
current travails of the Eurozone. The creation of a banking union, as well as the recapitalisation of Spanish
banks could prove important steps on the way to a recovery. But as in the 1970s, the last Eurozone compact
is also largely puffed up. Countless policymakers described it as a “breakthrough” or a “very ambitious
decision.” Yet the reality is somewhat more nuanced. To take but one example, the €120 billion allocated to
stimulate growth are, in fact, made of sums that are not really new: €55 billion come from unused structural
funds, €4.5 billion from the project bond pilot phase, and €60 billion from European Investment Bank (EIB)
loans (resulting from a €10 billion capital increase of the EIB).
The parallel with the 1970s is here striking. During the EMS negotiations, Ireland and Italy asked for “transfer
of resources” from richer member states (chiefly Germany) to less developed ones. They needed it, they
argued, in order to sustain their participation to a European-wide monetary scheme. During the last crucial
negotiation on the EMS, at the European Council in Brussels in December 1978, Helmut Schmidt strongly
opposed any such help. Italy and Ireland then asked for “a pause of reflection” before saying whether or not
they would participate in the EMS. Intense political discussions took place after the summit between all the
countries involved. They resulted in an agreement to give interest rate subsidies on EIB loans for Ireland. No
real transfer of resources would take place (let alone any increase in the EEC’s budget): the German
opposition was total. It was the responsibility of each member state to reform itself and converge with the
European average.
The June 2012 growth package, both by its size and by its nature, is unlikely to solve from one day to the next
the Eurozone’s problems – just as the EIB’s interest rate subsidy deal struck in 1978 was unlikely to solve by
itself the EEC’s structural problems. And the most important issues, like the creation of a banking union – or,
back in the 1970s, the creation of a European Monetary Fund – are indeed still under discussion. Looking
back at the EMS negotiations therefore not only provides insights into the past, but also helps in
understanding the pitfalls of present negotiations.
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